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Evidence
by Marc T. Treadweil
I. INTRODUCTION
The survey period saw a number of cases raising significant evidentiary issues but no startling developments. Two areas in particular should
be noted. As suggested in last year's survey,' lawyers engaged in civil
litigation should continue to be aware of decisions addressing the
admissibility of collateral source payments and the remedies available
when a party improperly injects the issue of collateral source payments.
All trial lawyers, especially those engaged in criminal practice, should
take note of the continued evolution of the "necessity" exception to the
hearsay rule.
Perhaps the most striking development came not from the appellate
courts but rather from the General Assembly. Official Code of Georgia
Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 24-3-18,2 which became effective July 19,
1997, is Georgia's newest exception to the hearsay rule. It provides for
the admission of medical records even though they contain opinions,
diagnoses, and conclusions.
II.

OBJECTIONS

In Sharpe v. Department of Transportation, the supreme court
emphatically reaffirmed the requirement that a contemporaneous
objection is necessary to preserve an alleged error for appellate review.4
In Sharpe the Department of Transportation ("DOT") did not object to
defendant's expert testimony at the time it was given. Rather, the DOT
* Partner in the firm of Chambless, Higdon & Carson, Macon, Georgia. Valdosta State
University (B.A., 1978); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1981). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 48 MERCER L. REV. 323 (1996).
2. O.C.GA. § 24-3-18 (Supp. 1997).
3. 267 Ga. 267, 476 S.E.2d 722 (1996).
4. Id. at 268, 476 S.E.2d at 723.
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moved to strike the testimony at the close of evidence.5 The court of
appeals held that the testimony was "illegal" evidence and could be
attacked by a motion to strike.6 Thus, the court of appeals held the
DOT did not waive its right to challenge the testimony by its failure to
make a contemporaneous objection. 7 The supreme court granted
certiorari and reversed!
The court first recognized that the "contemporaneous objection rule
has long been a mainstay of Georgia trial practice."9 However, if the
evidence in question is "illegal" evidence, then a party need not make a
contemporaneous objection but rather may move to strike the evidence.'0 This exception to the contemporaneous objection rule applies
primarily to hearsay evidence and is based on Georgia's unique principle
that hearsay evidence has no probative value even if it comes into
evidence without objection." The scope of "illegal" evidence has also
been recognized to include evidence obtained in violation of a criminal
defendant's constitutional rights."
However, the evidence at issue--expert testimony concerning the value of property-was not
hearsay evidence and did not impinge constitutional rights."3 Nevertheless, the court of appeals held that the evidence was illegal because
it concerned the wrong measure of damages. 14 The supreme court
rejected this expansion of the illegal evidence exception to the contemporaneous objection rule.'5
That, however, was not the reason the court granted certiorari.'
Rather, the court took the opportunity to re-examine the illegal evidence
exception and concluded that the time had come to abolish motions to
strike as a means of challenging evidence. 7 The court stated:
Accordingly, we overrule Patton v. Bank of Lafayette' [which sanc-

tioned the use of a motion to strike to attack illegal evidence] and

5. Id.
6. Department of Transp. v. Sharpe, 219 Ga. App. 466, 465 S.E.2d 695 (1995), rev'd,
267 Ga. 267, 476 S.E.2d 722 (1996).
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

219 Ga. App. at 467, 465 S.E.2d at 696.
267 Ga. at 271, 476 S.E.2d at 725.
Id. at 267, 476 S.E.2d at 723.
Id. at 268, 476 S.E.2d at 723.
Id.
Id.

Id.
219 Ga. App. at 467, 465 S.E.2d at 696.
267 Ga. at 268, 476 S.E.2d at 723.
Id.
Id.
124 Ga. 965, 53 S.E. 664 (1906).
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disallow the use of a motion to strike made at any point before the jury
retires as a procedural tool to object to evidence, except in those limited

instances where the evidence was inadmissible because it was obtained
in violation of a criminal defendant's constitutional rights .... -,
Implicit in the court's holding was a renunciation of the principle that
hearsay, even though not objected to, has no probative value and
therefore cannot support a verdict.
In Corbett v. State,"' the supreme court reaffirmed that when a
document contains both admissible and inadmissible information, a
party must object to the specific portions of the document that are
inadmissible.2 1 In Corbett the trial court admitted hospital records
pursuant to the business records exception to the rule against hearsay.2 However, under Georgia law, the business records exception does
not allow the admission of opinions." Although defendant objected to
the records on this ground, he did not, despite a request from the trial
judge, identify those portions of the records he claimed were objectionable.24 The supreme court held that defendant thus waived a hearsay
objection to the inadmissible portions of the hospital records.'
III. PRESUMPTIONS
The destruction of evidence by a party may give rise to a presumption
that the evidence would have been harmful to that party. This principle
is often referred to as the spoliation presumption. 2 The court of
appeals decision in Lane v. Montgomery Elevator Co. 27 demonstrates
the utility of this presumption. In Lane plaintiff was injured when the
elevator she was using malfunctioned. Montgomery, the installer and
maintainer of the elevator, contended that plaintiff had failed to produce
any evidence that it was negligent and therefore it was entitled to

19.

267 Ga. at 271, 476 S.E.2d at 725.

20. 266 Ga. 561, 468 S.E.2d 757 (1996).
21. Id. at 565, 468 S.E.2d at 761.
22. Id.
23. Baker v. State, 251 Ga. 464, 465, 306 S.E.2d 917, 918 (1983).
24. 266 Ga. at 565, 468 S.E.2d at 761.
25. Id.
26. In last year's survey, the author discussed the court of appeals decision in Chapman
v. Auto Owners InsuranceCo., 220 Ga. App. 539, 469 S.E.2d 783 (1996), in which the court
held that if a party destroys material evidence, the trial court is authorized to either
dismiss the case or to prevent that party's expert witnesses from testifying about the
evidence. Id. at 542-43, 469 S.E.2d at 786. Such a drastic remedy is appropriate when the
mere presumption that the evidence would be harmful is insufficient to cure the prejudice
created by the destruction of the evidence.
27. 225 Ga. App. 523, 484 S.E.2d 249 (1997).
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summary judgment. The trial court agreed.' On appeal, a six judge
majority of the court of appeals reversed.29
The majority noted that state law prohibited Montgomery from
repairing, altering, or placing the elevator back in service prior to an
appropriate government inspection.' Because there was evidence that
Montgomery repaired the elevator and placed it back in service prior to
such an inspection, the court held that plaintiff could rely on the
spoliation presumption to resist Montgomery's motion for summary
judgment.3 1 "[Sluch conduct would constitute a form of spoliation of
evidence, because by working on the elevator, the evidence would have
been tampered with, altered, or destroyed." 2 Thus, the plaintiff was
entitled to the benefit of the presumption that the "destroyed" evidence
was harmful to Montgomery, and this presumption, although rebuttable,
was sufficient to defeat Montgomery's motion for summary judgment.8 3
The spoliation presumption has some rather logical limitations. Thus,
in Georgia Board of Dentistry v. Pence,' the court of appeals rejected
a dentist's contention that disciplinary proceedings against her should
have been dismissed because the patient whose treatment was at issue
sought treatment from another dentist who repaired the first dentist's
work. The first dentist, Pence, argued that because her expert could not
inspect her allegedly shoddy dental work, the evidence could not be used
against her.35 The court rejected this contention for two reasons. First,
the court noted that in the typical case of spoliation, the destruction of
the evidence occurred during the litigation or at a time when litigation
had been threatened or contemplated." Second, the spoliation presumption is applicable to the destruction of inanimate objects. Here,
the alleged "spoliation" involved the treatment of a human being.'
"Carrying Pence's argument to its logical extreme, a tortfeasor could
accuse a victim's physician or surgeon of 'spoliation' for treating the
injuries inflicted by the tortfeasor.3 9 The court of appeals was not
prepared to take the spoliation presumption this far.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 523, 484 S.E.2d at 250.
Id. at 527, 484 S.E.2d at 253.
Id. at 525, 484 S.E.2d at 251.
Id. at 525-27, 484 S.E.2d at 251-53.
Id at 525, 484 S.E.2d at 251.
Id. at 525-27, 484 S.E.2d at 251-53.
223 Ga. App. 603, 478 S.E.2d 437 (1996).
Id. at 608, 484 S.E.2d at 442-43.
Id., 484 S.E.2d at 443.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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IV. RELEVANCY
Generally
In Larocque v. State,4' defendant contended that the trial court
improperly admitted evidence of his mere presence at various locations
in his trial for rape, false imprisonment, sexual battery, and battery. At
trial defendant denied that he was present at locations that were near
the victim's home and place of employment. The State then elicited
testimony from other witnesses that defendant was present at those
locations."' The court of appeals acknowledged that evidence of threats
or threatening conduct directed at witnesses may be relevant to prove
that a defendant intended to obstruct justice or avoid punishment.42
If sufficiently probative, that evidence is admissible a6 an admission by
conduct.4 However, evidence of defendant's mere presence at locations
near the victim did not constitute evidence of threats or threatening
conduct." Thus, the evidence was not relevant, and its potential
prejudicial effect required reversal of d3fendant's conviction.45
Chief Judge Beasley, Judge Andrews, and Judge Smith dissented.
They contended that defendant had not properly objected to the evidence
and that, even if he had, the evidence was relevant because it tended to
A.

show attempts to intimidate the victim. 47 Whether defendant's conduct

actually constituted attempts to intimidate the victim was a matter for
the jury, but the evidence was sufficiently probative to be relevant.4
B. Relevancy of Extrinsic Act Evidence
No evidentiary issue is more problematic or controversial than the
determination of the relevancy of extrinsic act evidence. Evidence is
"extrinsic" when it concerns conduct on occasions other than the one at

40. 224 Ga. App. 92,479 S.E.2d 450(1996), rev'd, No. S97G0631, 1997 WL 566211 (Ga.
Sept. 15, 1997). After the survey period, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals

decision in Larocque. However, the supreme court did not reverse on the grounds that the
intimidation evidence was relevant, but rather on the grounds that defendant had not
properly objected to the intimidation evidence.
41. 224 Ga. App. at 92, 479 S.E.2d at 450.
42. Id. at 93, 479 S.E.2d at 451.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 92,
Id. at 93,
Id. at 98,
Id.
Id. at 97,

479 S.E.2d at 450.
479 S.E.2d at 451.
479 S.E.2d at 454 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
479 S.E.2d at 453.
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issue. As a general rule, extrinsic act evidence is inadmissible. Like the
rule against hearsay, however, the rule against extrinsic act evidence is
known more for its exceptions than its flat prohibition. Extrinsic act
evidence may be admissible for a substantive purpose, such as when a
prosecutor tenders evidence of a similar transaction, usually a prior
criminal offense, to prove a defendant's motive to commit the charged
offense. Extrinsic act evidence may also be admissible to impeach or
bolster a witness. An example is when evidence of a felony conviction
is used to impeach a witness's character.
For years Georgia courts routinely and liberally admitted evidence of
similar, but totally unrelated, transactions in criminal cases. However,
as discussed in previous surveysi the Georgia Supreme Court in
Stephens v. State49 and Williams v. State' substantially tightened the
rules governing the admissibility of extrinsic act evidence in criminal
cases."
In Stephens the supreme court held that the prosecution
cannot rely solely on a certified copy of a prior conviction when seeking
to use that conviction as similar transaction evidence. 2 Rather, the
prosecution must offer evidence proving the requisite degree of similarity
or connection between the extrinsic act and the charged offense."' In
Williams the supreme court, in a dramatic departure from prior practice,
held that the prosecution must prove, prior to trial, three elements
First, the
before similar transaction evidence can be admitted."
prosecution must prove the relevance of the independent transaction to
Second, the prosecution must prove that the
a legitimate issue.
defendant committed the independent offense or act.55 Third, the
prosecution must prove a sufficient connection or similarity between the
independent transaction and the charged offense. 7 The trial court
must make a specific determination that the prosecution has carried its
burden of proving each of the three elements.5"
Notwithstanding Williams and Stephens, however, courts have
continued to allow prosecutors a largely free hand in the use of similar
transaction evidence. In last year's survey, the author questioned

49. 261 Ga. 467, 405 S.E.2d 483 (1991).
50. 261 Ga. 640, 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991).
51. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 45 MERCER L. REV. 229, 231 (1993); Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, 44 MERCER L. REV. 213, 216-20 (1992).
52. 261 Ga. at 468, 405 S.E.2d at 485.
53. Id. at 469, 405 S.E.2d at 486.
54. 261 Ga. at 642, 409 S.E.2d at 651.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.

58. Id.
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whether a change may be in the offing." This speculation was based
on the concurring opinions of Justices Fletcher and Sears in Farley v.
State"° attacking the routine admission of similar transaction evidence."1 However, if a change is in the offing, it seems it will be slow
in coming.
During the current survey period, Justice Fletcher revisited this
subject in a concurring opinion in Smith v. State." In Smith the
supreme court, with little discussion, rejected defendant's contention that
similar transaction evidence was not sufficiently similar to the charged
offense to be admissible.6" Justice Fletcher, again joined by Justice
Sears, concurred but worried that the majority opinion "continues the
confusing and unfair practice of allowing evidence of other crimes so long
as the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the independent
act is proved by 'sufficient' evidence."" Justice Fletcher wrote that this
vague language needed clarification.6" He urged the court to require
the prosecution to prove that a defendant committed the extrinsic act by
clear and convincing evidence.' If the supreme court follows Justice
Fletcher's lead, the Georgia standard for the admissibility of extrinsic act
evidence would be more stringent than the federal standard. In
Huddleston v. United States, 67 the United States Supreme Court
resolved a conflict among the circuits and held that the prosecution need
not prove by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant committed
the extrinsic act." Rather, the preponderance of the evidence standard
applies.'
In a shorter concurrence in Sheppard v. State,7" Justice Fletcher,
again joined by Justice Sears, accused the majority of "improper analysis
of 'other transactions' evidence."" In Sheppard the supreme court
rejected defendant's argument that the prejudicial effect of extrinsic act
evidence outweighed its probative value.72 The court reasoned that a

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 48 MERCER L. REV. 323, 327 (1996).
265 Ga. 622, 458 S.E.2d 643 (1995).
Id. at 627-31, 458 S.E.2d at 646-51 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
267 Ga. 363, 478 S.E.2d 379 (1996).
Id. at 364, 478 S.E.2d at 380.
Id. at 365, 478 S.E.2d at 381 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.

67. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 682.
See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 41 MERCER L. REV. 1357, 1359 (1990).
267 Ga. 276, 476 S.E.2d 760 (1996).
Id. at 280, 476 S.E.2d at 764 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
267 Ga. at 280, 476 S.E.2d at 764.
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trial court's conclusion that the evidence is relevant implicitly constitutes a finding that the prejudice caused by the evidence does not
outweigh the probative value of the evidence.78 Justice Fletcher argued
that the prejudice caused by the extrinsic act evidence should be a factor
in determining the admissibility of the evidence but not its relevancy.74
Thus, the court should first decide whether the evidence is relevant and,
if it is, it must "balance
the probative value of the evidence against its
75
effect."
prejudicial
The supreme court opinion in McGee v. State"5 perhaps sheds some
light on the division of the court on this issue. In McGee the court held
that the trial court improperly admitted extrinsic act evidence but held
that this error was harmless.77 Justices Hunstein and Benham
concurred specially to note their disagreement with the holding that
there was error.7 Justice Hunstein wrote that the court too vigorously
examined the differences between the charged offense and the extrinsic
act rather than focusing on their similarities.7"
Although a majority of the supreme court seems unwilling as yet to
restrain the use of similar transaction evidence, the court of appeals was
willing to take a harder look. In Tam v. State,' defendant contended
that the trial court did not make the necessary Williams determination
prior to the admission of similar transaction evidence. However, the
record did not include a transcript of the Williams hearing and the State
argued that, because defendant failed to provide a transcript, the court
of appeals must assume that the trial court's Williams determination
was correct. 8 ' The court rejected this argument:
Because the admission of evidence of similar offenses is the exception
rather than the rule, the State has the burden of ensuring that the
requirements of Williams are met before such evidence may be
admitted-and this includes ensuring that the trial court's determina-

tion that the State has made the necessary showings is on the
record.'

73. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 763-64.
74. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 764 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
75. Id.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

267 Ga. 560, 480 S.E.2d 577 (1997).
Id. at 564, 480 S.E.2d at 581.
Id. at 566, 480 S.E.2d at 583 (Hunstein, J., concurring).
Id. at 567, 480 S.E.2d at 583.
225 Ga. App. 101, 483 S.E.2d 142 (1997).
Id. at 102, 483 S.E.2d at 145.
Id. at 102-03, 483 S.E.2d at 142 (emphasis added).
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The court of appeals also applied rigid scrutiny to extrinsic act
evidence in Penson v. State.83 In Penson the trial court admitted
evidence of an unsolved vacant house fire that occurred after the charged
offenses of burglary and arson." Specifically, the trial court permitted
the State to adduce evidence that defendant was seen at the scene of the
subsequent fire. The State adduced no other evidence that defendant set
the fire.' The court of appeals held that this evidence was insufficient
to allow the court to make the Williams determination and, therefore,
reversed defendant's conviction.8"
C. Relevancy of Subsequent Remedial Measures
Evidence of subsequent remedial measures is generally inadmissible
in negligence actions."7 Thus, in Royals v. Georgia Peace Officer
Standards & Training Council,s e the trial court ruled that plaintiff
could not adduce evidence that defendants, after the death of plaintiff's
decedent during rigorous training as a law enforcement officer, instituted
measures to warn participants in training exercises of the physical
demands of the exercises.8 " Plaintiff contended that defendants failed
to warn her husband of the risk associated with the course and, thus,
should be held responsible for his wrongful death."
On appeal plaintiff contended that the trial court should have
admitted the evidence because it was relevant to prove the existence of
a duty to screen and warn course participants. Plaintiff also argued that
the evidence was admissible to impeach defendants' contentions that
warnings were not feasible, were unnecessary, had never been given,
and would not be given in the future.9' The court of appeals first
acknowledged that evidence of subsequent remedial measures may be
admitted for impeachment purposes.92 However, the court noted that

83.

222 Ga. App. 253, 256, 474 S.E.2d 104, 107 (1996).

84. Id. at 255, 474 S.E.2d at 107.
85. Id. at 256, 474 S.E.2d at 107.

86. Id. at 256-57, 474 S.E.2d at 107-08. In Harrisv. State, 222 Ga. App. 52, 54, 473
S.E.2d 232, 234 (1996), the court of appeals affirmed the admission of extrinsic act evidence
but nevertheless devoted considerable discussion to this issue, perhaps signaling a stricter

scrutiny of extrinsic act evidence.
87. General Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 213 Ga. App. 875,880,447 S.E.2d 302,308(1994)
(discussed in Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 47 MERCER L. REv. 127, 137-38 (1995)).

88.
89.
90.
91.

222 Ga. App. 400, 474 S.E.2d 220 (1996).
Id. at 400, 474 S.E.2d at 221-22.
Id. at 400-01, 474 S.E.2d at 222.
Id.

92. Id. at 401, 474 S.E.2d at 222.
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this exception to the general rule is very narrow: "A trial court must
apply this exception most judiciously to preserve continued viability of
the strong public policy against the introduction of evidence of remedial
measures for purposes of proving negligence .... ' The determination
of whether evidence of subsequent remedial measures can be used to
impeach a party's testimony is a matter left to the sound discretion of
the trial court and will not be reversed "absent manifest abuse."%
Here, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.05
The court also rejected plaintiff's contention that the evidence was
admissible to prove a duty on the part of defendants to screen and warn
Even assuming that the evidence had some
course applicants."
probative value in this regard, the court concluded this probative value
was substantially outweighed by the potential for prejudicial effect-that
the evidence would be viewed as an admission of negligence.'
D. Relevancy of CollateralSource Payments
In Warren v. Ballard," a case discussed in some detail in last year's
survey," the supreme court held that a party does not "open the door"
to the admission of evidence that he has health insurance when he
testifies that he suffered financial hardship because of his medical
bills."° The court reasoned that a party can only be impeached on a
material issue.'' Because anxiety over medical bills is not an item of
damages, testimony about anxiety is not relevant to a material issue
and, thus, a party cannot impeach a party who testifies he has suffered
this anxiety. 2 During the current survey period, the court of appeals
applied Warren in Worthy v. Kendall." In Worthy plaintiff contended
that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his receipt of disability
benefits. The trial court admitted this evidence after plaintiff's counsel
asked plaintiff, "'[Hiow have y'all handled the finances on [one]
income?'"'c" Although plaintiff's testimony inaccurately suggested that

93. Id.
94.

Id. at 402, 474 S.E.2d at 222-23.

95. Id.
96.
97.

Id., 474 S.E.2d at 223.
Id.

98. 266 Ga. 408, 467 S.E.2d 891 (1996).
99. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 48 MERCER L. REV. 323, 335-37 (1996).
100. 266 Ga. at 409-10, 467 S.E.2d at 893-94.
101.

Id. at 410, 467 S.E.2d 893.

102. Id.
103. 222 Ga. App. 324, 325-26, 474 S.E.2d 627, 629 (1996).
104. Id. at 325, 474 S.E.2d at 629.
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he had no income, the issue was not material. 0 5 Bound by Warren,
the court of appeals agreed with plaintiff and reversed.'
The court of appeals also applied Warren in Bennett v. Terrell.0 7 In
Bennett the court admitted testimony by plaintiff's doctor that she would
be seeking no further treatment because she would soon be settling her
case. The trial court concluded that this statement was relevant to
defendant's assertion that plaintiff was seeking medical treatment only
to boost the value of her claim against defendant.'
Plaintiff then
argued that she should be allowed to explain that her statement to her
doctor was based on the fact that she did not have medical insurance or
means to pay her bill and was intended to inform the doctor that he
would soon be paid for his treatments.' The court of appeals concluded that the explanation basically related to plaintiff's financial resources
and that under Warren the evidence is not admissible even to explain
other evidence."0
The supreme court's conclusion in, Warren, although based on
impeccable logic-certainly a party can only be impeached on a relevant
issue-is troubling as a practical matter. Even though testimony
suggesting the absence of health insurance coverage or anxiety resulting
from medical bills may be legally irrelevant, it is practically of great
significance. Similarly, testimony by an insured defendant that he could
not afford to pay any judgment entered against him would be extremely
prejudicial to a plaintiff. If in both situations the only remedy is to
object to this testimony, it is questionable whether a mere instruction
from the trial court to disregard the testimony will be effective to cure
the resulting prejudice.
E. Relevancy of PriorSexual Behavior
O.C.G.A. section 24-2-3"' prohibits the admission of evidence
relating to the prior sexual behavior of a rape victim unless the behavior
directly involved the accused and the evidence at issue supports an
inference that the accused could have reasonably believed that the
victim consented to the sexual activity."2 Although the statute refers

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 224 Ga. App. 596, 597, 481 S.E.2d 583, 585 (1997).
108. Id. at 596, 481 S.E.2d at 584.

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id. at 597, 481 S.E.2d at 584-85.
O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3 (1995).
Id.
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only to1 3rape prosecutions, it has been held to apply to child molestation
cases.

During the present survey period, defendant in Green v. State114
contended that his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was
impinged when the trial court barred defendant from asking a thirteen
year-old victim whether she was sexually active at the time of the
alleged assault. Defendant argued that the victim had a motive to
falsely accuse him because she was pregnant and did not want her
parents to know that she had engaged in consensual sex; thus, she
fabricated the attack."' The court of appeals rejected defendant's
argument."16 The court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses is not absolute and in appropriate
situations must bow to other concerns." 7 The policy served by the
Rape Shield Statute" is one of those concerns:
[T]o allow the introduction of evidence of a witness' past sexual

behavior for the purpose of showing that she may have been pregnant
at the time the allegations were made and may have therefore made
up the charges in an effort to justify or explain the pregnancy, would
be to permit defendants to circumvent the Rape Shield Statute and
thwart the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute." 9
The Rape Shield Statute does not prohibit evidence that a rape or
molestation victim has previously falsely accused others of sexual
misconduct.' 20 In Peters v. State,'2' the trial court refused to allow

defendant to cross-examine a ten year-old victim about her prior
allegedly false allegations of molestation made against other men. The
trial court also refused to allow defendant to cross-examine the victim
about her distrust of men."m The court of appeals acknowledged that
the Rape Shield Statute permits the introduction of evidence of prior
false allegations.
However, before the evidence can be admitted, the
trial court must, out of the presence of the jury, make a threshold
determination that a reasonable probability of falsity exists. 24 In

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Flowers v. State, 220 Ga. App. 814, 816-17, 468 S.E.2d 199, 202 (1996).
221 Ga. App. 436, 472 S.E.2d 1 (1996).
Id. at 436, 472 S.E.2d at 1.
Id. at 437, 472 S.E.2d at 2.
Id. at 436-37, 472 S.E.2d at 2.
O.C.G.A § 24-2-3.
221 Ga. App. at 437, 472 S.E.2d at 2.
Smith v. State, 259 Ga. 135, 137-38, 377 S.E.2d 158, 160 (1989).
224 Ga. App. 837, 481 S.E.2d 898 (1997).
Id. at 839, 481 S.E.2d at 900.
Id.
Id
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Peters defendant did not offer any evidence that the prior allegations
were false, and the trial court refused to conduct a hearing because
defendant had not filed a motion seeking to introduce the evidence and
had not made the required threshold showing." The court of appeals
held that defendant was not required to make a threshold showing
before he was entitled to a hearing." Rather, once defendant raised
the issue, the trial court was obligated to conduct a hearing."2
Accordingly, the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court to
conduct a hearing to determine whether defendant could adduce
evidence sufficient to show a reasonable probability that the victim's
prior allegations were false.' 28
V. PRIVLEGES
In Johnson v. State," defendant contended that the trial court
improperly admitted incriminating photographs depicting sexual activity
between defendant's wife and a thirteen year-old girl. Defendant, who
took the pictures, contended that the pictures were privileged attorneyclient communications because he gave the photographs to his divorce
attorney to use in his divorce action. When defendant was subsequently
charged with child molestation, the divorce attorney showed the
photographs to the district attorney. The divorce attorney, who at the
time was unaware that defendant had taken the photographs, thought
the photographs would compromise the credibility of defendant's wife
and thus weaken the case against defendant. When the district attorney
demanded that the photographs be turned over, the divorce attorney
obtained a court order sealing the photographs. However, the court
subsequently unsealed the photographs and allowed them to be used as
evidence."
Defendant contended that the photographs were confidential
communications protected by the attorney-client privilege."'1 The court
of appeals disagreed, concluding that the photographs were not
communications but rather were "tangible evidence of a similar
crime. " ' Had the photographs been found in defendant's possession,

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 840, 481 S.E.2d at 900.
222 Ga. App. 722, 475 S.E.2d 918 (1996).
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they could have been confiscated.'
The fact that defendant gave the
photographs to his attorney did not make them privileged. 1
VI.

OPINION TESTIMONY

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.135 the United States
Supreme Court, in a dramatic departure from prior practice, overruled
Frye u. United States,' rejecting the longstanding Frye test for
determining whether novel or experimental test procedures or other
matters that are the subject matter of expert testimony have become
sufficiently established to be admissible in court. 37 In Orkin Exterminating Co. v. McIntosh," the court of appeals refused to adopt the
Daubert test and reaffirmed the so-called Harper test traditionally
applied by Georgia courts requiring a determination that the evidence
in question has reached a "scientific stage of verifiable certainty.""s
In Carr v. State,"° the Georgia Supreme Court used the Harpertest
to determine whether the trial court properly admitted evidence in
defendant's convictions of malice, murder, and first degree arson.""
In Carr the prosecution contended that defendant injured his wife to
prevent her escape from a fire he had set in their home. The State
argued that defendant had used an accelerant to start the fire and
offered evidence that a dog trained to give an alert when he smelled
certain hydrocarbons had given an alert at the home. Defendant
contended that this evidence was inadmissible because it had not
reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty. The trial court ruled
that the Harper test was not applicable. 42 The supreme court first
noted that the type of evidence constituting scientific test evidence that
should be subjected to the Harper test had not been addressed."
However, in the many cases in which Harper had been applied to
determine the admissibility of scientific tests, all involved expert opinion
based on analysis of data.'" In Carr the dog's handler testified, based

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
509 U.S. at 579.
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215 Ga. App. 587, 452 S.E.2d 159 (1994).

139. Id. at 593, 452 S.E.2d at 165 (quoting Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 525, 292
S.E,2d 389, 395 (1982)).

140. 267 Ga. 701, 482 S.E.2d 314 (1997).
141. Id. at 703, 482 S.E.2d at 317.

142. Id. at 702, 482 S.E.2d at 317.
143. Id. at 703, 482 S.E.2d at 317.
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upon his analysis of the dog's behavior, that an accelerant was present." Thus, dog alert evidence is similar to any other scientific test
data in that an expert is required to render an opinion based on analysis
of data.1" Therefore, the court held that dog alert testimony should
be subjected to the Harpertest."
Although the trial court held a lengthy pretrial hearing at which the
State presented evidence on the dog's and its handler's training and
experience and general information on the use of dogs to detect
accelerants, the supreme court held that this evidence did not prove with
verifiable certainty that dog alert evidence was an accurate and reliable
means of determining whether accelerants were present. 4s Thus, the
court held that the trial court improperly admitted the dog alert
evidence.'
The court of appeals returned to a recurrent issue during the survey
period-the extent to which police officers can give opinion testimony in
civil suits arising from accidents they investigated. In McMichen u.
Moattar,W the trial court permitted the investigating officer to testify
that defendant did not contribute to or cause the collision at issue.'5 '
The court of appeals acknowledged that in Jefferson PilotLife Insurance
Co. v. Clark,'" it had held that an investigating officer may testify
concerning the cause of a motor vehicle collision.'" However, Clark
also stands for the proposition that the subject of the officer's opinion
must first be a proper one for expert testimony. 54 Expert testimony
is admissible only when the subject matter is beyond the ken of laymen.
Thus, whether an investigating officer may testify as to the cause of a
collision depends upon the particular facts of the case. In McMichen the
officer's opinion was unnecessary because the collision was fairly simple
and jurors would
have been able to draw their own conclusions as to who
5
was at fault.
145. Id. at 702, 482 S.E.2d at 316.
146. Id. at 703, 482 S.E.2d at 317.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 704, 482 S.E.2d at 318.
149. Id. at 704-05, 482 S.E.2d at 318. Carr is also significant and interesting for its
denunciation of gross prosecutorial misconduct by a former high profile assistant district
attorney. "We conclude that the conduct of the prosecuting attorney in this case
demonstrated her disregard of the notions of due process and fairness, and was inexcusable." Id. at 711, 482 S.E.2d at 322.
150. 221 Ga. App. 230, 470 S.E.2d 800 (1996).
151. Id. at 230, 470 S.E.2d at 801.
152. 202 Ga. App. 385, 414 S.E.2d 521 (1991).
153. 221 Ga. App. at 230, 470 S.E.2d at 801.
154. Id., 470 S.E.2d at 802.
155. Id.
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The court of appeals also addressed plaintiff's contention that the trial
court erred in admitting opinion testimony from eyewitnesses that
defendant could not have avoided the collision.'" The court acknowledged that its earlier opinions addressing this issue were apparently
inconsistent. 5 7 However, lay opinion testimony is admissible when the
matter at issue is so complex or so difficult to describe that a recitation
of facts is not adequate to convey to the jury the true point of a witness's
testimony." In this situation a witness may express impressions or
opinions based upon the facts and circumstances observed by the
witness." In McMichen the witness testified in detail about what he
saw, but his opinion that the accident was unavoidable was not apparent
from that testimony.16° It is interesting that the collision was so
simple that the investigating officer's opinion testimony was not
admissible, but the lay witness's observations were so complex that his
opinion testimony was admissible.
The court of appeals returned to this issue in Xiong v. Lankford.""'
In Xiong plaintiff's child was killed when he was struck by defendant's
vehicle. The trial court allowed lay witnesses to testify in response to
hypothetical questions that the accident was unavoidable. The court did
not cite McMichen nor hold that the admissibility of such evidence is
dependent upon the complexity of the matter at issue or the ability of
witnesses to describe the event without expressing opinions. Rather,
citing O.C.G.A. section 24-9-65" 6 for the arguably improper proposition
that any witness may give opinion testimony once a sufficient foundation
is laid, the court held that the evidence provided a sufficient foundation
for the witnesses' opinions.'6 Because the witnesses had sufficient
opportunity to form opinions, their testimony expressing those opinions
was admissible.' Moreover, the court reasoned that the witnesses did
not express opinions on the ultimate issue of negligence but rather only
testified that, in their opinion, they could not have seen the child under
the circumstances.'

156. Id. at 232, 470 S.E.2d at 802.
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The supreme court addressed the issue of the permissible scope of both
expert and lay opinion testimony in Johnson v. Knebel.' In Johnson
the court of appeals affirmed the admission of an accident reconstructionist's opinion that a plaintiff's injuries were caused by an initial
impact rather than a subsequent impact."l 7 This opinion, the accident
reconstructionist testified, was not based upon tests and examinations,
but rather was based solely on his review of photographs. The trial
court ruled this was admissible expert opinion testimony.'6 The court
of appeals, however, concluded that the reconstructionist's testimony was
admissible as the opinion of a lay witness." Although the reconstructionist's opinion was not based upon his professional qualifications and
thus was not expert testimony, he was able as a lay witness to give an
opinion as long as he stated the basis of his opinion. 70
The supreme court granted certiorari and reversed.' 7 , The court
first noted that lay witnesses may give opinion testimony only when
their opinion is based on their own observations and when the opinion
is necessary for the witness to convey those observations to the jury. 2
The opinion of a lay witness is not admissible when the jury may readily
reach its own opinion because all of the facts and circumstances upon
which the opinion is based are capable of being clearly defined or
described. 7 Even though the trial court admitted the reconstructionist's testimony as an expert opinion, the court of appeals concluded that
the testimony was admissible as a lay opinion.""4 This, the supreme
court held, was error. 76 Before an expert can give lay opinion testimony, the trial court should take precautionary measures to ensure that
the expert does not opine on matters outside the scope of his expertise
or on facts of which he has no personal knowledge. 76 Further, the
jury should be informed which portion of the expert's testimony is given
as an expert witness and which portion is given as a lay witness. 77
The trial court, because it admitted the testimony as expert testimony,
did not take the precautionary measures and thus the court of appeals
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not properly find that the testimony was admissible lay testimocould
178
ny.
Moreover, even if the trial court had admitted the testimony as the
opinion of a lay witness and taken appropriate measures to ensure that
the jury knew the reconstructionist was not testifying as an expert, the
testimony still would have been inadmissible.'79 A lay witness can
state an opinion only when the opinion is based upon his own observations and when the witness cannot adequately explain to the jury the
"In other words, the
conclusion to be drawn from his observations"
jury, being apprised of the same information as the lay witness, when
possible will be allowed to think for itself and draw its own conclusions
from such information." 8 ' The reconstructionist's opinion that the
first collision caused the plaintiff's injuries was based solely upon his
review of photographs and was not admissible because the photographs
were in evidence and the jury was just as qualified and capable as the
reconstructionist to draw conclusions from those photographs."8 2
Arguably, Moore v. Graham" pushes the bounds of proper opinion
testimony. In Moore the investigating officer testified that plaintiffs
exaggerated their injuries.' 84 Again citing O.C.G.A. section 24-965,85 the court held that the officer had extensive experience in
accident investigation and, based upon his firsthand knowledge of the
accident, had a sufficient basis to express an opinion as to whether
plaintiffs exaggerated their injuries.' 6
In Corbett v. State,87 defendant attempted to rely on opinion
testimony from its expert, a medical doctor. The trial court, after voir
dire of the witness, qualified the witness as a medical expert except in
the field of pathology."' The supreme court held that this was
error.'s9 The witness was a trained physician licensed to practice
medicine in Georgia, and he was thus qualified under Georgia law to
testify on pathological matters. 9" Similarly, in Carr v. State, the
supreme court held that the trial court erred in ruling that defendant's
178. Id. at 856, 485 S.E.2d at 454.
179. Id.
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fire investigator was not qualified to testify on the use of dogs to detect
the presence of accelerants because he was not trained as a dog
handler. 9 ' Citing Corbett, the Court held that when a witness is
qualified as an expert in a field, he is qualified to testify regarding the
whole field.'9
VII.

HEARSAY

A. Legislative Developments
Prior to July 1, 1997, Georgia law sharply limited the use of medical
reports as evidence. For example, Georgia's business records exception
to the hearsay rule, the primary means of curing hearsay objections to
documentary evidence, does not allow the admission of opinions or
diagnoses contained in medical records.'" Thus, portions of medical
records containing opinions or conclusions cannot be admitted into
evidence upon proper objection.'" Georgia law is much more narrow
than the business records exception in the Federal Rules of Evidence
that authorizes the admission of business records containing opinions or
diagnoses. 9 5
However, a newly enacted statute may dramatically broaden the use
of medical records in personal injury litigation. The 1997 session of the
General Assembly enacted O.C.G.A. section 24-3-18,'9 which provides
that in personal injury cases, a "medical report in narrative form which
has been signed and dated" by a healthcare professional is admissible to
prove diagnoses, prognoses, and interpretations of tests or examinations. " The statute requires the party propounding the medical
report to give notice to the adverse party sixty days prior to trial.'"
The adverse party then may object to the report on grounds other than
In addition, the adverse
hearsay within fifteen days of its receipt.'
party has the right to cross-examine the author of the report.2' The
report itself "shall be presented to the jury as depositions are presented
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to the jury," ° which presumably means that the propounding party
will read the report to the jury The report will not "go out with the jury
as documentary evidence."' °
O.C.G.A. section 24-3-18 became effective July 1, 1997; thus, there are
not yet appellate decisions available to assist in the interpretation of the
statute. However, the statute raises several issues. Perhaps the first
that will be addressed by the courts is whether the statute applies
retroactively. Because it is a rule of evidence, it seems logical that it
will be considered procedural in nature and, thus, can be applied
retroactively. This, however, is not necessarily a safe assumption. For
example, the supreme court held that the provision of the Tort Reform
Act of 19872' abolishing the collateral source rule and thus making
evidence of collateral source payment admissible was a substantive
change in the law and could apply only to causes of action accruing on
or after the effective date of the statute. 2" Also, the courts will likely
be called upon to determine what constitutes a "medical report in
narrative form." For example, is a letter to a plaintiff's attorney
outlining a physician's treatment of the plaintiff and her diagnoses and
conclusions a "medical report?"
Some hint of the practical effect of O.C.G.A. section 24-3-18 may be
found in workers' compensation cases. O.C.G.A. section 34-9-102205
provides for the admission of medical reports in workers' compensation
claims and is similar, although not identical, to O.C.G.A. section 24-3-18.
In the typical workers' compensation case, the claimant's attorney relies
on the medical report at the hearing, and the employer must depose the
treating physician in order to cross examine the physician about the
opinions contained in the report. Thus, as a practical matter, O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-102 shifts the economic burden of convening the physician's
deposition to the defense. O.C.G.A. section 24-3-18 may well have a
similar effect. On the other hand, workers' compensation cases are not
tried before a jury, and plaintiffs' attorneys could conclude that reading
a medical report to a jury will not have the same impact as live or
videotaped testimony. Of course, a plaintiff's attorney, in an effort to
save expense, could announce the intention to rely on a medical report
and then, when the defense convenes the deposition, take the opportunity to conduct a direct examination of the physician. In that event, the
parties will no doubt dispute the order in which the physician's
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deposition testimony will be presented. Can a plaintiff conduct a direct
examination of a physician at a deposition convened by the defendant
and then use that examination in plaintiff's case-in-chief?
Undoubtedly, O.C.G.A. section 24-3-18 will spawn these and other
issues and will be the subject of much litigation. Perhaps all that can
be said with certainty is that the General Assembly has released an
unknown element onto the field of personal injury litigation.
B. The Necessity Exception
Last year's survey chronicled the dramatic evolution of Georgia's
necessity exception to the rule against hearsay."6 This exception to
the hearsay rule, which can be traced to the supreme court decision in
McKissick v. State,' allows the admission of hearsay evidence that
would never have been admissible under even the broadest interpretations of previously recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. Not
surprisingly, prosecutors have heartily embraced the necessity exception.
During the current survey, defense attorneys also attempted to exploit
the exception. Because the necessity exception is so new, its boundaries
are ill-defined, and thus, appellate courts are frequently asked to rule on
whether trial courts properly admitted or excluded such evidence.
As discussed below, O.C.G.A. section 24-3-1(b) 2' has been cited as
the basis for the necessity objection, but it seems that this provision
provides, at best, shaky support for the far-reaching decisions of the
court of appeals and supreme court. By its terms, O.C.G.A. section 24-31(b) appears to limit the use of hearsay evidence, noting that hearsay
evidence is admissible "only in specified cases from necessity."2 ' Ten
years ago, research would have indicated that the "specified cases"
referred to firmly established statutory and common law exceptions to
the hearsay rule. However, beginning with McKissick, the courts began
reading O.C.G.A. section 24-3-1(b) expansively rather than restrictively.210 In McKissick the Georgia Supreme Court noted that "O.C.G.A.
§ 24-3-1(b) permits the use of hearsay evidence 'in specified cases from
necessity.'" 21 1 Missing from the court's quotation of the statute, of
course, is the word "only." In McKissick the court went on to note that
the statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule were not exhaustive and
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that hearsay evidence could be admitted in the absence of a statutory
and 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiexception if "'necessity'
, 2 12
ness' are established."
In Dix v. State, 21 the Georgia Supreme Court appeared to expand
the necessity exception. In Dix defendant was convicted of murdering
his former wife. At trial the wife's divorce attorney testified that his
client told him that defendant had choked her, threatened to kill her,
dry fired a gun at her head, and said that no restraining order would
stop him.2 4 The court declined to adopt a "bright line rule" that
statements of a client to a divorce attorney are admissible under the
necessity exception to the hearsay rule.21 5 However, examining the
circumstances of the statements at issue, the court held that the
statements were sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted. 2 6 In a
concurring opinion, Judge Hunstein went further; she argued that a
client's statements made in the course of the attorney-client relationship
are always sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted unless there is
a reason for the client to give false information to
evidence establishing
217
the attorney.

The utility of the necessity exception to prosecutors is demonstrated
by the Georgia Supreme Court decision in Farmer v. State.2I8 In
Farmer defendant's wife asserted her marital privilege and refused to
testify at defendant's probation revocation hearing at which the State
sought to revoke defendant's probation based upon an alleged assault on
his wife. After the wife refused to testify, the State called a magistrate
court clerk who testified that the wife had come to his office to pay
overdue fines on an unrelated matter. The wife claimed that she had
not paid the fines because she had been hospitalized with injuries
inflicted by her husband. The clerk then asked the wife whether she
wanted to "do something about it,"219 and when the wife said that she
did, the wife executed an affidavit providing details of the husband's
assault.220 The trial court permitted the clerk to testify to the contents
of the wife's statements and her affidavit, ruling that the testimony was
evidence admissible as prior testimony given under oath of an unavailable witness and that the evidence was admissible as substantive
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Id. at 433, 479 S.E.2d at 743 (Hunstein, J., concurring).
266 Ga. 869, 472 S.E.2d 70 (1996).
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evidence pursuant to Gibbons u. State"--Georgia'srather unique rule
that allows the admission of prior inconsistent statements as substantive
evidence.222
On appeal the supreme court summarily held that the evidence was
not admissible either as prior testimony or as a prior inconsistent
statement.2" The evidence was not admissible as prior testimony
because pursuant to that exception of the hearsay rule, the party against
whom the testimony is being offered must have had an opportunity to
cross-examine the unavailable witness at the prior hearing. 4 Because
defendant did not have that opportunity, the clerk's testimony about the
The
wife's statements was not admissible as prior testimony.2
evidence was not admissible as a prior inconsistent statement because
the wife did not testify at the probation revocation hearing about the
assault and thus gave no in-court testimony that was inconsistent with
her prior statement.226 Consequently, there was nothing for the prior
statement to be inconsistent with, and therefore, her prior statements
were not admissible.
The State, however, argued that the evidence was admissible pursuant
to the necessity exception to the hearsay rule. The court acknowledged
this possibility, but because the trial court made no findings with regard
to the trustworthiness of the evidence at issue, the court remanded the
case to the trial court for further consideration of this issue.227
Justices Carley, Thompson, and Hines dissented. They argued that the
undisputed facts surrounding the circumstances under which the wife
made her statements established, as a matter of law, the circumstantial
trustworthiness of her statements and that her statements were thus
admissible pursuant to the necessity exception." 8
Not to be outdone, defense attorneys have turned to the necessity
exception as a means of admitting hearsay evidence that would never be
admitted under traditional hearsay analysis. In Turner v. State,22
defendant unsuccessfully tendered a letter written by defendant's halfbrother to defendant's mother. In the letter, the half-brother admitted
that he had committed the crime and that defendant was not present
when the crime was committed. The half-brother did not testify at
221.
222.
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227.
228.
229.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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defendant's trial because he invoked his constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination. 2"
The supreme court, prompted somewhat by the constitutional
implications of refusing to admit evidence critical to a defendant's
defense,"3 1 held that the trial court should have analyzed whether the
letter was admissible pursuant to the O.C.G.A. section 24-3-1(b)
necessity exception.232 Accordingly, the court remanded the case for
a determination.'
In Nelson v. State,2 3 a defendant attempting to rely on the necessity
exception found a less receptive audience. In Nelson the trial court
refused to admit a statement given by a confidential informant to
defendant's attorney two weeks after defendant's arraignment. The
confidential informant did not testify at trial. However, narcotics agents
testified that the confidential informant told them that defendant had
supplied the informant with cocaine.' The court of appeals held that
the passage of time rendered the statement insufficiently trustworthy to
be admitted under the necessity exception.' Further, the confidential
informant had given a contrary statement to authorities."7 Under
these circumstances, the court held that the trial court did not err in
excluding the evidence.'
The court of appeals holding that the passage of time rendered the
statement insufficiently trustworthy is notable because it appears to
conflict with the view of at least some justices on the supreme court. In
Farmer, discussed above, three dissenting justices concluded that the
"passage of time ... is immaterial, since, unlike the res gestae exception,
there is no requirement that statements admitted under the 'necessity'
exception be characterized by 'spontaneity."2 9 Also, the court of
appeals' point that the informant's statement conflicted with his
previous statement was no doubt exasperating to defendant's attorney.
Of course, the State was inconsistent; that was the reason defendant
tendered the statement.
In sum it seems that in a remarkably short period of time, the
necessity exception to the hearsay rule has become firmly established in
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Georgia although criminal defense attorneys may argue that it has been
more firmly established for prosecutors than it has for defendants.
Indeed, it can be questioned whether the sometimes loose analysis of
hearsay evidence admitted under the necessity exception satisfies the
rigid requirements of the confrontation clause. In this regard, it is ironic
that, thus far, the necessity exception has been applied more frequently
in criminal cases, in which the confrontation clause applies, rather than
in civil cases, in which the confrontation clause does not stand as an
impediment to the admission of hearsay statements.
C. PriorOut-of-Court Statements
Georgia has two rather unusual rules regarding the admissibility of
prior statements by witnesses. In Gibbons v. State,'"the supreme
court held that prior inconsistent statements of a witness are admissible
as substantive evidence if the witness is subject to cross-examination.2 4' In Cuzzort v. State,2' the supreme court, in apparent frustration over the inability to secure convictions in child molestation cases
prior to the enactment of the Child Hearsay Statute,2' held that a
prior consistent statement is admissible as substantive evidence against
an accused if the witness is present at the trial and subject to crossexamination.2'
Both Gibbons and Cuzzort require that the person making the out-ofcourt statement testify at trial.2'
Thus, the State in Render v.
State2' could not avail itself of Cuzzort or Gibbons to support the
admission of an out-of-court statement made by a witness who did not
testify. Rather, the State argued that the out-of-court statement, which
incriminated defendant, was admissible to explain the conduct of the
arresting officer.2' Acknowledging that a statement offered to explain
conduct, rather than to prove the truth of the statement, may be
admissible as non-hearsay, the supreme court noted that the officer's
conduct must first be a relevant issue.'
In a criminal prosecution,
the circumstances that would justify the admission of an out-of-court
statement of a non-testifying defendant to explain an officer's conduct
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O.C.G-. § 24-3-16 (1995).
254 Ga. at 745, 334 S.E.2d 662.
248 Ga. at 864, 286 S.E.2d at 722; 254 Ga. at 745, 334 S.E.2d at 662.
267 Ga. 848, 483 S.E.2d 570 (1997).
Id. at 849, 483 S.E.2d at 571.
Id
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are "'rare.'" 9 All officers are bound to investigate criminal activity,
and thus, evidence purporting to explain why an officer investigated a
matter is not relevant."5 The court gave no credit to the State's
argument that the statement incriminating defendant was relevant to
prove why the officer continued his investigation when the defendant
denied his involvement. If this made evidence relevant, then virtually
any fact uncovered in an investigation would be admissible in evidence
because virtually any fact can explain an officer's conduct in an
investigation. Accordingly, the supreme court reversed defendant's
conviction.5 1
D.

Miscellaneous
In McGaha v. Stae,252 the court of appeals addressed the distinction
between authentication of a document and the admission of a document
containing hearsay. In McGaha defendant argued that a document was
admissible pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 24-7-20,21 which provides a
method of authenticating a public record. This statute is somewhat
similar to O.C.G.A. section 24-7-8,2 which provides procedures for
authenticating medical records. These statutes, the court held, do
nothing more than provide a means for authenticating documents.255
They do not render hearsay in the documents admissible.2

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. (quoting Teague v. State, 252 Ga. 534, 536, 314 S.E.2d 910, 914 (1984)).
Id. at 850, 483 S.E.2d at 573.
Id. at 849, 483 S.E.2d at 572.
221 Ga. App. 440, 471 S.E.2d 533 (1996).
O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20 (1995).

254. Id. § 24-7-8.

255. 221 Ga. App. at 441, 471 S.E.2d 534.
256. Id., 471 S.E.2d at 534-35.

